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Background. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has typically been used to confirm or refute hospital/ward outbreaks of methi-
cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) identified through routine practice. However, appropriately targeted WGS strategies 
that identify routinely “undetectable” transmission remain the ultimate aim.
Methods. WGS of MRSA isolates sent to a regional microbiological laboratory was performed as part of a 12-month prospective 
observational study. Phylogenetic analyses identified a genetically related cluster of E-MRSA15 isolated from patients registered to 
the same general practice (GP) surgery. This led to an investigation to identify epidemiological links, find additional cases, and deter-
mine potential for ongoing transmission.
Results. We identified 15 MRSA-positive individuals with 27 highly related MRSA isolates who were linked to the GP surgery, 
2 of whom died with MRSA bacteremia. Of the 13 cases that were further investigated, 11 had attended a leg ulcer/podiatry clinic. 
Cases lacked epidemiological links to hospitals, suggesting that transmission occurred elsewhere. Environmental and staff screening 
at the GP surgery did not identify an ongoing source of infection.
Conclusions. Surveillance in the United Kingdom shows that the proportion of MRSA bacteremias apportioned to hospitals is 
decreasing, suggesting the need for greater focus on the detection of MRSA outbreaks and transmission in the community. This case 
study confirms that the typically nosocomial lineage (E-MRSA15) can transmit within community settings. Our study exemplifies 
the continued importance of WGS in detecting outbreaks, including those which may be missed by routine practice, and suggests 
that universal WGS of bacteremia isolates may help detect outbreaks in low-surveillance settings.
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In the United Kingdom, the emergence of the epidemic methi-
cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (EMRSA) 15 lineage 
(multilocus sequence type [ST] 22) in 1991 was followed by its 
rapid dissemination throughout UK hospitals and long-term 
care facilities (LTCFs) [1–4]. This was associated with a dra-
matic increase in the rate of MRSA bacteremia until rates began 
to decline in the mid-2000s [5]. Voluntary reporting of MRSA 
bacteremia in England was replaced by mandatory reporting in 
2001 [6], to which mandatory enhanced epidemiological sur-
veillance was added in 2005 [7]. Since 2013, investigation of 
MRSA bacteremia requires a locally administered postinfection 
review (PIR), which aims to identify how the case occurred and 
preventive actions to avoid recurrence. Consequently, responsi-
bility for cases are attributed to the organization best placed to 
implement these actions [8].
Currently, only 40% of these reported bacteremia cases are 
attributed to a hospital, which suggests that transmission out-
side of hospitals is a substantial contributor to overall MRSA 
bacteremia rates [9]. Definitive evidence for community trans-
mission as a driver of MRSA infection in the United Kingdom 
is limited, but is supported by a recent epidemiological and bac-
terial genomic survey that captured transmission events over a 
16 000-km2 area of the East of England [10]. This argued against 
conventional wisdom that ST22 is largely healthcare associated 
in the United Kingdom [1, 11], and provided evidence for a 
substantial burden of MRSA transmission outside of hospital 
settings (ie, in the community).
Despite this, the focus on MRSA prevention and control 
remains hospital-centric. Here, we characterize the commu-
nity-based transmission of EMRSA-15 (typically considered 
a nosocomial lineage) in a general practice (GP) surgery. 
This study argues for a renewed focus on infection control in 
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community settings and demonstrates the role of bacterial 
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) in community MRSA sur-
veillance and infection control.
METHODS
Study Design
A cluster of 13 MRSA-infected individuals registered to a 
single GP surgery in Cambridgeshire was first detected dur-
ing a 12-month prospective study of all MRSA-positive sam-
ples processed by the Public Health England (PHE) Clinical 
Microbiology and Public Health Laboratory, Cambridge 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (CUH) in 
Cambridge, United Kingdom. This study has been described in 
detail elsewhere [10]. In brief, 1465 individuals were identified 
with MRSA isolated at least once from either screening swabs 
and/or clinical specimens, and WGS of 2282 MRSA isolates 
from these cases. Combined analysis of WGS data revealed a 
single large cluster of closely related MRSA (defined based on 
a pairwise single-nucleotide polymorphism [SNP] distance <50 
SNPs) that contained 22 isolates from these 13 individuals. This 
formed the starting point for a public health investigation and 
the study described here.
Public Health Investigation
The detection of the MRSA cluster resulted in an investiga-
tion conducted in May 2015 by the local PHE health protec-
tion team. The GP surgery had >10 000 registered patients and 
provided specialist services including diabetic and podiatry 
clinics. The 13 people involved in the MRSA cluster (defined 
as cases) were sent an information sheet and details of opt-out 
consent prior to individual GP record review. If consent was 
not withheld and records were available, data were collected on 
demographics, comorbidities, and date of first MRSA detection. 
In the 6 months prior to each patient’s first recorded positive 
MRSA result, healthcare attendance (primary care, hospi-
tal outpatient, or inpatient) and microbiological samples that 
were MRSA negative were recorded. Incidence rates of MRSA-
positive individuals were calculated per 10 000 registered 
patients at the study surgery. The CUH laboratory information 
system was used to determine incidence of MRSA positivity 
based on samples submitted to CUH from 4 comparable prac-
tices within the same region (defined as practices with >10 000 
registered patients in the same GP classification group) [12]. All 
data were collected and analyzed within the context of the pub-
lic health investigation.
Staff at the GP surgery were invited to undergo MRSA 
screening (nose/throat/groin swabs) following attendance at an 
information session and written consent. Environmental MRSA 
screening was performed at 40 sampling points in the building. 
Samples were taken from high-contact equipment and surfaces 
in the following areas: 2 randomly selected medical clinic con-
sultation rooms, 2 nursing clinic rooms (where the ulcer clinic, 
which was the strongest epidemiological link between patients, 
was held), and shared patient waiting areas. At each sampling 
point, an area of approximately 10 cm × 10 cm (or entire surface 
of handles) was swabbed and cultured for MRSA using direct 
plating onto chromogenic agar [13].
Extended case finding was performed to identify further 
cases that might be linked to the cluster over a longer time 
period, and for whom MRSA isolates had been stored and 
could be retrieved for sequencing. This involved 3 different 
approaches (1) A  retrospective search was performed of the 
CUH information system for MRSA-positive samples submit-
ted by the GP surgery between January 2006 and June 2015. 
These data were then cross-referenced with the bacterial arch-
ive database to determine if isolates had been stored at –80°C. 
(2) Laboratory surveillance was conducted in the laboratory 
between November 2015 and February 2016 to detect MRSA-
positive individuals from the GP surgery. (3) Recent PIRs at 
the GP surgery were reviewed. Isolates were requested from 
the receiving hospital for WGS and patient records reviewed as 
described above.
Whole-Genome Sequencing, Typing, and Data Analysis
DNA was extracted, libraries were prepared, and 150-bp paired 
end sequences were determined on an Illumina HiSeq2000 
(original study isolates) or MiSeq (isolates identified through 
additional case finding). Methods were as previously described 
[14]. Details of reads and depth of coverage/N50 are provided 
in Supplementary Table 1. Sequence data were submitted to the 
European Nucleotide Archive (www.ebi.ac.uk/ena; accession 
numbers are also listed in Supplementary Table  1). STs were 
assigned using sequence data, an in-house script, and the mul-
tilocus sequence type (MLST) database (http://saureus.mlst.
net/), and STs were assigned to clonal complexes (CCs). Isolates 
were mapped using SMALT (http://www.sanger.ac.uk/science/
tools/smalt-0) to the E-MRSA15 reference genome (strain HO 
5096 0412, accession number HE681097). Mobile genetic ele-
ments, indels, and regions of high-density SNPs were excluded 
to identify the phylogenetically informative core genome for 
each isolate, and SNPs were used to create a midpoint-rooted, 
maximum-likelihood phylogeny using RAxML with 100 boot-
straps [15]. Trees were visualized using Figtree (http://tree.bio.
ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/) and ITOL (http://itol.embl.de/). In 
silico polymerase chain reaction of the variable X-region of the 
spa gene was undertaken using the genome data and published 
primers [16]. Spa type was then determined using SpaTyper 
(http://spatyper.fortinbras.us).
Ethical Considerations
Study protocol approval for the prospective study was granted 
by the National Research Ethics Service (reference (11)/
EE/0499), the National Information Governance Board Ethics 
and Confidentiality Committee (reference ECC 8-05(h)/2011), 
and the Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
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Research and Development Department (reference A092428). 
The 13 people involved in the MRSA cluster were sent an infor-
mation sheet and details of opt-out consent prior to individual 
GP record review. All data were collected and analyzed within 
the context of the public health investigation.
RESULTS
During the year-long prospective MRSA study of carriage and 
clinical MRSA isolates in the East of England between April 
2012 and April 2013, we identified a number of potential out-
breaks based on genomic relatedness and epidemiological links 
[10]. One potential outbreak consisted of 13 MRSA-positive 
individuals (22 isolates) registered with the same GP surgery in 
Cambridgeshire and therefore was of particular interest. All 13 
isolates were ST22 and part of the EMRSA-15 clade (Figure 1). 
We initiated an investigation to rule out ongoing transmis-
sion, and to elucidate if this represented community-based 
transmission or “spill-over” from a hospital/LTCF. Extended 
case finding identified additional MRSA-positive individuals 
attending the same GP with samples available for sequencing 
(Figure  2). First, retrospective review of electronic laboratory 
records identified 4 individuals with a total of 7 isolates retriev-
able for sequencing, one of whom (patient [P] 04) had already 
been identified in the initial 13 cases. Second, prospective sur-
veillance of MRSA-positive samples sent from the GP surgery 
over 3  months between November 2015–February 2016 and 
surveillance of new positive MRSA samples by the infection 
control team identified 3 retrievable isolates from 3 individ-
uals. Third, 2 PIRs had been undertaken in 2014–2015 (P12/
P13). Both patients had died with MRSA bacteremia in another 
regional hospital. A single isolate from each blood culture was 
obtained for each patient from the admitting hospital. A sum-
mary of the 22 patients (34 isolates) from the original study 
and additional case finding is provided in Table 1. The median 
number of MRSA isolates per patient was 1 (range, 1–4). Four 
patients had only screening samples submitted. Of those clinical 
Figure 1. Maximum likelihood tree generated from single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) sites in the core genome for 1715 CC22 isolates from the 2012–2013 study. 
The clade highlighted in gray is the largest cluster (with a maximum SNP cutoff of 50) within the collection, and represents patients registered to the study general practice 
surgery.
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samples submitted, 61% were reported as superficial swabs of 
lower limbs/foot, while 3 were from blood cultures and 1 from 
pus (all from different patients).
Genetic Analysis
Spa genotyping showed that the cluster was formed of 2 main 
spa types (t032, t294) with 3 additional variants (Supplementary 
Figure 1). STs were derived from WGS data for the 12 MRSA iso-
lates identified through additional case finding. The predominant 
ST was ST22 (7 isolates, 3 individuals), the remainder being ST45 
(3 isolates, 3 individuals), ST6 (1 isolate), and ST1539 (a single-lo-
cus variant of ST221, 1 isolate). The non-ST22 cases were excluded 
from further analysis. After combining the 22 ST22 isolates from 
the original study and 7 from additional case finding to a total of 29 
ST22 isolates, a maximum-likelihood tree was constructed based 
on SNPs in the core genome compared to the EMRSA-15 refer-
ence genome. This demonstrated clustering of 27 of the 29 ST22 
isolates from 15 individuals (Figure 3), now referred to as cases. Of 
these, 13 had been identified in the original cluster and the add-
itional 2 isolates were from 2 cases (P12 and P13) identified during 
PIRs of bloodstream infections. The median pairwise SNP distance 
between the 27 cluster isolates from these 15 cases was 21 (range, 
0–58; interquartile range [IQR], 10–37). The median pairwise SNP 
distance for cluster isolates from the same person (in 8 cases with 
>1 isolate) was 5 (range, 0–60; IQR, 1.5–15.5). One patient (P04) 
had cluster isolates that extended over a period of 34 months (a 
basal isolate in 2012, and 3 isolates in 2014–2015 with pairwise dis-
tances of 60, 59, and 57 SNPs from the 2012 isolate).
Public Health Investigation
To further understand the cluster, a public health investiga-
tion was performed to investigate the 15 genomically linked 
cases, together with screening of staff and the environment 
for the presence of MRSA. Two of the 15 cases (P14/P15) were 
excluded from further epidemiological analysis due to missing 
patient records or refusal of consent. Of the remaining 13 cases, 
the median age was 80 years (range, 12–91; IQR, 61.5–81.5) at 
the time of the investigation, and 6 cases (46%) were women. 
Geographical mapping of first MRSA isolation date and place of 
residence for each case demonstrated that cases lived within 5.6 
km of each other and 2 individuals (P10/P11) lived on the same 
street. No cases lived in the same household or LTCF.
Review of sample requesting information showed a pre-
dominance of lower limb swabs (cases with samples including 
lower limb, 9; screen alone, 1; bacteremia alone, 2). GP med-
ical records revealed that the date of first recorded MRSA-
positive sample for cases ranged from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 4A). 
Healthcare contact by each case in the 6 months prior to first 
MRSA detection was extensive for all but 2 patients (Figure 4B). 
Six of the 13 cases had attended hospital in this period, of 
whom 3 cases (P08/P11/P12) had attended only 1 hospital, 2 
cases (P05/P13) had attended 2 different hospitals, and 1 case 
(P10) had attended 3 different hospitals. Crucially, no overall 
link could be made between cases and attendance at a hospital 
(Figure 4A). Six individuals had 1 or more samples that were 
negative for MRSA in the 6 months prior to their MRSA first 
detection date, and had no record of hospital attendance in the 
Figure 2. Flow diagram summarizing patient identification. One patient was captured by both the community cluster and extended retrospective laboratory record review. 
Abbreviation: WGS, whole-genome sequencing.
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intervening time. Eleven of the 13 cases had attended the GP 
leg ulcer clinic. P5 and P11 had not, but P11 lived on the same 
road as P10.
A total of 57 GP surgery staff (approximately 90% of cur-
rent clinical/nonclinical employees) received multisite MRSA 
screens, all of which were negative. This included 4 nurses who 
had worked at the ulcer clinic since the first positive MRSA 
samples in 2008. Forty environmental samples were taken from 
communal waiting areas and clinic rooms, all of which were 
also MRSA negative.
Given that this cluster was only identified fortuitously by 
genome sequencing, we sought to determine if the incidence 
rate in the practice had been higher than that expected. This was 
achieved by comparing the incidence rate of MRSA-positive 
samples submitted to the CUH diagnostic microbiology labora-
tory between 2006 and 2013 between the study GP surgery and 4 
other practices of a similar size and patient demographic within 
Cambridgeshire. This showed a fluctuating rate over time for all 
4 practices, with no identifiable outbreak signal for the general 
practice under investigation (Supplementary Figure 2).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we found that routine infection control failed to 
detect or prevent a community cluster involving 15 people who 
carried or were infected with ST22 MRSA. This was despite 2 
fatal cases of bacteremia that were investigated using standard 
public health procedures [17] but were not linked to each other 
or the cluster until WGS was undertaken. Overall, epidemio-
logical evidence was consistent with onward MRSA transmis-
sion in the community, although the precise circumstances 
under which this occurred could not be defined. Most patients 
were high users of primary care services including a GP leg 
ulcer clinic, although transmission through other unidentified 
contacts cannot be ruled out.
Table 1. Patient and Sample Information
Study ID Isolation Year Sample Type/Site Method of Identification MLST
Within Phylogenetic 
Cluster?
Included in Public 
Health Investigation?
P01_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P02_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P02_2 2013 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P03_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P03_2 2012 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P04_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P04_2 2015 Clinical, ankle This study, laboratory record review 22 Yes Yes
P04_3 2014 Screen This study, laboratory record review 22 Yes Yes
P04_4 2014 Screen This study, laboratory record review 22 Yes Yes
P05_1 2012 Clinical, unspecified Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P06_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P06_2 2012 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P07_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P07_2 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P07_3 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P08_1 2012 Clinical, foot Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P09_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P10_1 2012 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P11_1 2013 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P11_2 2013 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes Yes
P12_1 2014 Clinical, blood This study, PIR 22 Yes Yes
P13_1 2015 Clinical, blood This study, PIR 22 Yes Yes
P14_1 2012 Clinical, leg Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes No
P14_2 2012 Clinical, unspecified Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes No
P15_1 2012 Clinical, back Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes No
P15_2 2012 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes No
P15_3 2013 Screen Coll et al, 2017 22 Yes No
P16_1 2014 Clinical, genital This study, laboratory record review 6 No No
P17_1 2014 Clinical, finger This study, laboratory record review 45 No No
P18_1 2014 Screen This study, laboratory record review 22 No No
P19_1 2015 Screen This study, laboratory record review 45 No No
P20_1 2015 Screen This study, prospective surveillance 45 No No
P21_1 2016 Clinical, blood This study, prospective surveillance 1539 No No
P22_1 2016 Clinical, abscess This study, prospective surveillance 22 No No
Abbreviations: MLST, multilocus sequence type; P, patient; PIR, postinfection review.
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One case (P04) had a history of testing MRSA positive since 
December 2008, and WGS on available isolates confirmed car-
riage of the same MRSA lineage over a period of 34 months. 
The diversity within the isolates from P04 encompasses that of 
isolates from all other cases, potentially suggesting that per-
sistent carriage in this case had contributed to spread of this 
lineage. Due to limited sampling, it is not possible to rule out 
reinfection, but the most recent common ancestor of these iso-
lates would have dated to around 2006 (based on an SNP rate of 
~3.5 SNPs/genome/year in ST22 [18]), consistent with carriage 
since that date. The important contribution of long-term MRSA 
carriers to transmission in hospitals has been shown previously 
[19], and is likely to be relevant in other settings. Decolonization 
of persistent carriers with chronic wounds such as leg ulcers is 
notoriously difficult, and rigorous infection control is required 
during treatment such as dressing changes when bacterial shed-
ding can occur. MRSA was not isolated from staff or the envir-
onment at the GP practice during a point-prevalence survey, 
but this was performed a considerable period of time after the 
cluster had become established and was undertaken largely to 
identify modifiable factors.
MRSA ST22 is the most common MRSA lineage associated 
with healthcare-associated infection in the United Kingdom, 
and based on the higher overall prevalence of MRSA in hospitals 
vs the community in the last few decades, it has been assumed 
that the predominant directionality of spread is from hospitals 
into the community. Previous studies conducted in the United 
Kingdom have isolated ST22 from the community [20–22], but 
bacterial typing lacked sufficient resolution to infer transmis-
sion. To support this, spa genotyping of the cluster isolates in this 
study was undertaken, and based on the presence of a number 
of spa types it is unlikely that such typing would have identified 
this cluster. WGS has been used to confirm that transmission of 
a Panton-Valentine Leukocidin-positive, single locus variant of 
ST22 occurred from a special-care baby unit into the commu-
nity, where it subsequently persisted [23, 24]. By contrast, the 
findings of our study suggest that most cases (9/13) associated 
with the MRSA cluster had either not attended a hospital or had 
at least 1 intervening sample that was MRSA negative in the 6 
months prior to first MRSA detection. The majority of cases had 
links to clinic attendance in the community (in particular for 
ulcer care), providing genomic evidence for transmission of this 
typically nosocomial lineage within community rather than hos-
pital settings.
A greater focus is needed to detect MRSA transmission in the 
community if overall MRSA bacteremia rates are to be further 
reduced. The role of infection prevention and control in the com-
munity will become increasingly relevant as initiatives are rolled 
Figure 3. Phylogenetic analyses of 29 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus sequence type 22 isolates from 15 cases linked to a general practice surgery. Midpoint 
rooted maximum likelihood tree based on single-nucleotide polymorphisms in the core genome. Each isolate is labeled as patient (P) study number_isolate number_year of 
isolation. Circles indicate multiple isolates from the same patient, with each color being unique to a patient. Cases without circles signify from patients those with a single 
isolate only. Abbreviation: SNP, single-nucleotide polymorphism.
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out that increase delivery of care outside hospitals [25], and will 
require a review of the current predominantly hospital-centric 
structure of infection services [20]. Several methodological 
approaches could be considered. A low-cost passive surveil-
lance option would count cases from submitting locations over 
time, associated with a defined threshold above which an inves-
tigation is triggered. However, the protracted period over which 
transmission occurred in the cluster described here meant rates 
of MRSA over time for the GP surgery were comparable with 
other similar practices. Consequently, the real-time analysis of 
Figure 4. A, Date of first known positive methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) sample (denoted by black star) for 13 individuals investigated in public 
health investigation, and the preceding 6-month window (gray boxes) during which contacts with healthcare for each case were established. Red open circles denote date of 
genomically confirmed cluster lineage MRSA samples for each individual. B, Timeline summarizing healthcare contact for 13 cases in the 6 months prior to first MRSA-positive 
sample. The timeline for each case does not necessarily overlap, and ranges between 2006 and 2015. Recorded contact with healthcare represented as follows: open circle, 
hospital; red square, ulcer clinic; open square, any other general practice visit. Black crosses indicate date of negative MRSA sample.
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epidemiological data from this practice is unlikely to have trig-
gered an outbreak investigation. However, the addition of WGS 
allowed robust assessment of the relatedness of MRSA isolates 
and cases, and the implementation of surveillance WGS to con-
trol procedures may be a necessary tool if MRSA transmission 
is to be targeted by rapid interventions.
This study has a number of limitations. We cannot exclude 
that the outbreak may have been detected through other typ-
ing methods not undertaken here, such as pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis. We did not undertake sampling for asymptomatic 
MRSA carriers in the wider community, which is likely to have 
underrepresented the extent of the cluster. Only a small propor-
tion of the MRSA isolates from samples submitted by the GP 
surgery were available for sequencing, reducing the number of 
cases that could be included from the retrospective look-back. 
The study was not sufficiently powered to conduct a case-case 
design (cases with MRSA assigned to the cluster vs unrelated 
MRSA cases) to determine specific risk factors for MRSA acqui-
sition, as comparison between practices was limited due to the 
variation in services provided. Finally, not all staff who may have 
been involved in the cluster were screened for MRSA due to staff 
turnover.
In conclusion, the detection of transmission and outbreaks 
associated with MRSA ST22 carriage and infection in the com-
munity is incomplete. In particular, this case study demonstrates 
the need to consider GP surgeries as transmission hotspots. 
Whereas WGS of all MRSA isolates from GP surgeries may not 
be cost-effective, this case study demonstrates how universal 
WGS of bacteremia isolates can detect relatedness and potential 
transmission events in settings that are not typically regarded as 
foci of transmission. Systematic WGS strategies could provide 
more accurate attribution of source, provide a mechanism for 
more efficient targeting of infection control, and lead to further 
reductions in the number of people who become colonized by, 
and go on to develop, MRSA bacteremia.
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